Western sanctions have shut off Russia's access to the leading global chip designers and manufacturers. The longer the sanctions last, the more the Russian microelectronics industry will fall behind.
Some good analysis here. Thank you. Coming out of the university in the late 1980's one of my first jobs was with a company that worked to import high technology products & processes from the USSR & EEuro. We had business exchanges with some high-end Soviet chip manufacturers. It soon became clear to us & our Soviet contacts how far off the pace the Soviets were in chip manufacturing. (Fiber optic tech was a different story).
As your report briefly touches on, there is a whole ecosystem behind the public face of chip manufacturing. This report in the FT is sobering analysis for those who want to reshore, or go it alone in chip manufacturing https://on.ft.com/3zCckNA.
Also, software is a crucial part of the efficiency & effectiveness of information technology. However, there is a limit to how much software can overcome hardware deficiency.
Western sanctions on Russian energy are a self-inflicted wound with disturbing global implications - and limited short/medium term impact on Russia. However, western technology sanctions will have a rapid & debilitating impact on Russian domestic development - generally unappreciated by the pre-internet elements of the Kremlin elite.
Dear David: Thanks for your good comment. Your point about "fiber-optics" being a "different matter" intrigues me. The fall of the Soviet Union had one immediate and dramatic consequence—one that has remained largely unnoticed in the Western literature --the wholesale modernization of the country’s trunkline system. This was largely due to one man, Vladimir Bulgak, who was the last Soviet minister of Communications and brought his ministry over to the Yeltsin side during the attempted coup of August 1991. Over the following five years, Bulgak obtained $520 million in credits from Denmark and Japan, and contracted with Danish and Japanese companies to install a brand-new system of digital optic-fiber trunklines that connected Russia through a modern network with the rest of the world, (The story is told in Soldatov and Borogan, Red Web, pp. 46-47.)
But that suggests that the Russians needed help with fiber-topics from outside. Is that your perception as well? Best, TG
A brief postscript to my reply above: Russia in the summer of 2021 started up its first large fiber-optic cable plant in Murmansk oblast. It will supply cable for Russia’s first major undersea cable, called “Polar Express,” which will be laid in 2026. (Aleksei Grammatchikov, “Chik—i Interneta net?” Ekspert, No. 41, October 10 2022, via Eastview. ) Does this item too suggest that until now the Russians have been replying on foreign fiber-optics, at least for civilian needs? Best, TG
Despite the article being title '“Intel Inside”? In Russia, the Chips are Down', you assert that only TSMC and Samsung are capable of advanced process nodes. It's unclear if you were talking about the 3nm ones or process nodes smaller than 22nm. Anyway, Intel should be in this list as well. Their Intel 4 is equivalent to TSMC's 4nm process node and in 2023, Intel 3 will be equivalent to TSMC's 3nm node
Dear John: Thanks for your very useful comment. I'm sorry if Iwasn't clear.
I didn't include Intel with TSMC and Samsung's 3-nanometer capability because, as I understand it, Intel does not have the fabrication capability to go into mass production of it, whereas TSMC and Samsung do. (My source on this is Chris Miller's Chip War, pp. 2017ff. The actual situation may be more nuanced than Miller's account, because Intel does have several fab facilities around the world.)
The main point of my post, however, is about the Russians. At this moment they appear unable to produce chips with nodes smaller than Mikron's 180 nanometers, and even then only in small quantities. In particular, they do not seem to have been able to cross the "FinFET divide" (which comes at 22 nm, hence my use of that number.) And they now lack the working contact with the foreign leaders that would enable them to overcome that problem quickly.
Dear Theophilus: Your points are all well-taken. Your last line, of course, is the one that resonates the most: "Hopefully the war will be over long before then." Well, amen to that.
But in the meantime, I think there are three obstcles that will continue to hold the Russian back. One is the Russians' bias toward overcentralized bureaucratic solutions. The second will be a lack of money for the massive investments required to develop an all-Russian fab capability. The third, and perhaps most important, is the lack of direct face-to-face interaction. Technology transfer seems to happen most rapidly and efficiently through people, working together on the ground.
Some good analysis here. Thank you. Coming out of the university in the late 1980's one of my first jobs was with a company that worked to import high technology products & processes from the USSR & EEuro. We had business exchanges with some high-end Soviet chip manufacturers. It soon became clear to us & our Soviet contacts how far off the pace the Soviets were in chip manufacturing. (Fiber optic tech was a different story).
As your report briefly touches on, there is a whole ecosystem behind the public face of chip manufacturing. This report in the FT is sobering analysis for those who want to reshore, or go it alone in chip manufacturing https://on.ft.com/3zCckNA.
Also, software is a crucial part of the efficiency & effectiveness of information technology. However, there is a limit to how much software can overcome hardware deficiency.
Western sanctions on Russian energy are a self-inflicted wound with disturbing global implications - and limited short/medium term impact on Russia. However, western technology sanctions will have a rapid & debilitating impact on Russian domestic development - generally unappreciated by the pre-internet elements of the Kremlin elite.
Dear David: Thanks for your good comment. Your point about "fiber-optics" being a "different matter" intrigues me. The fall of the Soviet Union had one immediate and dramatic consequence—one that has remained largely unnoticed in the Western literature --the wholesale modernization of the country’s trunkline system. This was largely due to one man, Vladimir Bulgak, who was the last Soviet minister of Communications and brought his ministry over to the Yeltsin side during the attempted coup of August 1991. Over the following five years, Bulgak obtained $520 million in credits from Denmark and Japan, and contracted with Danish and Japanese companies to install a brand-new system of digital optic-fiber trunklines that connected Russia through a modern network with the rest of the world, (The story is told in Soldatov and Borogan, Red Web, pp. 46-47.)
But that suggests that the Russians needed help with fiber-topics from outside. Is that your perception as well? Best, TG
A brief postscript to my reply above: Russia in the summer of 2021 started up its first large fiber-optic cable plant in Murmansk oblast. It will supply cable for Russia’s first major undersea cable, called “Polar Express,” which will be laid in 2026. (Aleksei Grammatchikov, “Chik—i Interneta net?” Ekspert, No. 41, October 10 2022, via Eastview. ) Does this item too suggest that until now the Russians have been replying on foreign fiber-optics, at least for civilian needs? Best, TG
Despite the article being title '“Intel Inside”? In Russia, the Chips are Down', you assert that only TSMC and Samsung are capable of advanced process nodes. It's unclear if you were talking about the 3nm ones or process nodes smaller than 22nm. Anyway, Intel should be in this list as well. Their Intel 4 is equivalent to TSMC's 4nm process node and in 2023, Intel 3 will be equivalent to TSMC's 3nm node
Dear John: Thanks for your very useful comment. I'm sorry if Iwasn't clear.
I didn't include Intel with TSMC and Samsung's 3-nanometer capability because, as I understand it, Intel does not have the fabrication capability to go into mass production of it, whereas TSMC and Samsung do. (My source on this is Chris Miller's Chip War, pp. 2017ff. The actual situation may be more nuanced than Miller's account, because Intel does have several fab facilities around the world.)
The main point of my post, however, is about the Russians. At this moment they appear unable to produce chips with nodes smaller than Mikron's 180 nanometers, and even then only in small quantities. In particular, they do not seem to have been able to cross the "FinFET divide" (which comes at 22 nm, hence my use of that number.) And they now lack the working contact with the foreign leaders that would enable them to overcome that problem quickly.
I hope this helps. Best, TG
Dear Theophilus: Your points are all well-taken. Your last line, of course, is the one that resonates the most: "Hopefully the war will be over long before then." Well, amen to that.
But in the meantime, I think there are three obstcles that will continue to hold the Russian back. One is the Russians' bias toward overcentralized bureaucratic solutions. The second will be a lack of money for the massive investments required to develop an all-Russian fab capability. The third, and perhaps most important, is the lack of direct face-to-face interaction. Technology transfer seems to happen most rapidly and efficiently through people, working together on the ground.
Best, TG