Western sanctions on oil production have had only a limited impact so far. But their effects will show up increasingly as the 2020s move on, in the form of steadily higher costs and delays.
Your points are well taken. That's why I stressed in my post that in the long-term, constraints on infrastructure and funding may turn out to be more important than the sanctions. As for the role of technology, however, one should bear in mind that it is a moving front. The people who would at the forefront of those advances, and therefore the the most useful to the Russian companies, would likely themselves be employees of major foreign companies, and therefore vulnerable to Western secondary sanctions. (All this assumes, of course, that Western sanctions are still in effect, say, ten years out.)
Your points are well taken. That's why I stressed in my post that in the long-term, constraints on infrastructure and funding may turn out to be more important than the sanctions. As for the role of technology, however, one should bear in mind that it is a moving front. The people who would at the forefront of those advances, and therefore the the most useful to the Russian companies, would likely themselves be employees of major foreign companies, and therefore vulnerable to Western secondary sanctions. (All this assumes, of course, that Western sanctions are still in effect, say, ten years out.)